Quantum Key Distribution: Simulation and Characterizations  by Jasim, Omer K. et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  65 ( 2015 )  701 – 710 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877-0509 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Universal Society for Applied Research
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2015.09.014 
ScienceDirect
International Conference on Communication, Management and Information Technology (ICCMIT 2015) 
Quantum Key Distribution: Simulation and Characterizations 
Omer K. Jasima*, Safia Abbasb, El-Sayed M. El-Horbatyb and Abdel-Badeeh M. Salemb 
aPh.D.  student, Al-Ma’arif University College, Anabr, +964, Iraq 
b Faculty of Computer and Information Sciences, Ain Shams University 
Abstract 
All traditional cryptographic algorithms used in the network communication environments, relied on mathematical 
models and computational assumptions, are actually unsafe and apt by many attackers (quantum and man-in-the-
middle attacks). Therefore, nowadays Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises a secure key agreement by using 
quantum mechanical systems. QKD becomes a significant trend of new cryptographic revolution. This paper explains 
how cryptography exploits the quantum mechanics in order to achieve an encryption/decryption process. Additionally, 
this paper provides a standard simulation for QKD-BB84 protocol and describes improvement key generation and key 
distribution mechanisms. Then, validation, results and efficiency of BB84 protocol are presented using different 
security configurations. Finally, our results indicated that the QKD is susceptible to corporate with different security 
applications and achieve the key availability for such applications. However, it suffers from the higher rate of 
authentication cost. 
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1. Introduction  
The term of secure communication is an abstract concept that can cause serious problems during the measurement, 
transmission and computation processes [1]. In this era, secure communication environments are required by the 
masses and huge companies in order to guarantee a secure exchange of their data through open environment [2]. Thus, 
most of them are relied on Public Key algorithms (PK) thinking of them; it is reliable and secure. 
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Although PCKs’, especially with large and randomly generated keys, are safe and trust within the context of current 
technology. However, they can well become invalid when extremely high-performance quantum computers come into 
actual existence and adopt [3, 4]. A quantum algorithm with polynomial time for factorization has already been 
discovered and applied [5]. Therefore, if quantum computers become a reality, PCKs would become obsolete. 
In order to such adversity, will be coming from the quantum computer, QKD is an excellent solution for that.  
Theoretically, QKD provides an unconditional security (achievable only when the key length is same as message 
length [4] which are missing from computational security (cryptosystem based on a mathematical model). 
Furthermore, QKD depending on quantum mechanics in order to make sure that any measurement modifies the state 
of the transmitted quantum bits (qubit). This modification can be detected by the sender (Master) and the receiver 
(Slave) of the quantum bits.  
Currently, key distribution and management algorithms can establish a shared secret key over an insecure classical 
communication channels [5]. The security of these algorithms based on the fact that successful eavesdropping requires 
excessive computational effort (computational security). QKD brings an entirely new way of solving the key 
distribution problem. It provides secure key distribution via the laws of quantum mechanics [6]. In addition, several 
protocols support the QKD system to be viable such as Bennett and Brassard-1984 (BB84), Eckert -1991 (E91) and 
Bennett-01992 (B92) [4, 5, 6]. 
This paper presents a holistic simulation that simulates a QKD by utilizes the BB84 protocol with different 
configurations (noise level, length of initial qubits and attack influence). Many features led to based BB84 protocol, 
such as a higher bit rate (up to 6 Mbps), secure up to 140 KM and resistance against Photon Number Splitting (PNS) 
and Man-in-the-middle (MITM)attacks[7]. Also, this paper presents an analytical analysis for the obtained results and 
discusses the QKD usage and integration susceptibility with other security applications (algorithms). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the recent studies that focused on QKD simulation 
and improvement. QKD concept and protocol are given in Section 3. Section 4 illustrates the experimental setup for 
the QKD-BB84 protocol. Experimental results are resolved from the experimental environment, and discussions are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents the conclusion and future works. 
2. Related Works  
Newly, QKD is a new emerging technology for protecting sensitive data during transmission process in a new 
communications environment. So, many researchers have focused on the simulation of QKD to achieve a secure 
communication for files depending on different simulator environments.   
Mohsen S.and Hooshang A.[6] reviewed a modification to the BB84 protocol that is logically claimed to increase 
its efficiency. They are presented the simulation of BB84 and discussed the results. Moreover, the authors improved 
such protocol and showed that the efficiency of the improved version without undermining the security level of BB84 
protocol.  
Amrin M. et al. [7] proposed an algorithm that gives a solution to MITM attack in BB84. It uses computational 
security algorithms and chooses another algorithm for generation key from image algorithm. By using these two keys, 
computational key and Information theoretic key, both will constitute hybrid key and use it for further communication. 
This proposed system doesn’t offer offline key establishment and scalability. 
Sufyan T. and Omer K. [8] presented the integration of the techniques of unconditionally secure authentication 
from classical cryptography with QKD. The output of such integration is a two-party authenticated quantum key 
distribution protocols (based on BB84) that takes care of the problem are associated with above studies and reducing 
the authentication cost. As far as the phases constituting each QKD session are concerned, two modes of authentication 
have been considered: "partial" authentication and "full" authentication modes. The proposed authentication modes, 
especially the full mode, are effected on the efficiency of such QKD system. 
Hui Q. and Xiao Ch. [9] employed the BB84 protocol as the basic model of QKD in depolarization channel. Also, 
they are presented the simulation of QKD protocol using MATLAB simulator. The simulation results are consistent 
with the theoretical results. A sufficient analysis for the obtained results in this study is weak. 
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Marcin N. and Andrzej R. [11] described a new concept of security measurement in QKD and proposed a new 
concept of entropy of security in QKD and a unique measure of security be defined. Authors presented two different 
security levels, the basic security level and the advanced security level. This differentiation of security helps to choose 
the appropriate security level for specific end-users’ requirements and needs. However, the authors did not test the 
strength of the developed system against intrusion attacks. 
Finally, Table 1. summarizes all above surveys paper and explains the objective, scope of study and pros and cons 
for each one. 
Table 1. Existing studies for QKD simulation and development  
Authors, ref. and Year Proposed Tech. Advantage  Disadvantages 
Mohsen S. Hooshang A. [6, 2007] a new version of 
BB84 
Increase the length 
of quantum key 
Long time of key 
generation 
Amrin M. et al. [7, 2013] Hybrid key 
(security image and 
BB84) 
Avoid the  MITM 
attack  
doesn’t offer 
offline key 
establishment and 
scalability 
Sufyan T. and Omer K. [8,2010] A standard 
simulator for QKD 
environment  
Reducing the 
authentication 
cost(key 
availability 
Decrease the 
efficiency of 
proposed system. 
Hui Q. and Xiao Ch. [9, 2009] BB84 through 
depolarizing 
channel 
It nears to real 
environment 
Weak in result 
analysis 
Marcin N. and Andrzej R. [11, 2012] A new security 
measurement in 
QKD 
appropriate 
security level for 
specific end-users’ 
ambiguity 
resistance against  
attacker 
 
3. QKD: Concept and Protocol 
QKD is used to distribute an encryption key for symmetric and asymmetric ciphers, and it is not to transmit any 
plain data between communication parties (usually called master and slave). In this era, a lot of QKD protocols have 
been created, nevertheless, few are used in practice [8]. The QKD is merely used to negotiate secret quantum keys 
among parties through two communication channels, classical and quantum channels, like Unshielded Twisted Pair 
(UTP) and fiber optic channels. In a sense, QKD comes as an alternative to the existing “public/secret key distribution 
system.  
The first invented protocol was BB84 [9]. This protocol, based on photon polarization (states aided to transmit 
classical information over a quantum channel), is the most reputable solution in practice quantum cryptographic 
environment. Others protocol, such as B92 or E91 are modified versions of the BB84 protocol. Both communication 
parties must have devices or simulators that can generate and detect pulses of light in different polarization. As shown 
in figure1, secure privacy of the BB84 protocol stemmed from encoding the classical information in non-orthogonal 
states (vertical-V, horizontal-H, left diagonal-LD and right diagonal-RD, for more details about photon polarization 
computing see [9, 10]). The characteristic of quantum physics, the state cannot be measured without discarding or 
disturbing it, is a central feature that bolstered the strength of quantum cryptographic key [11].  
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Fig. 1. Photon states ( ௦ܲሻ െ orthogonal sate 
In order to generate a secret quantum cryptographic key depending on BB84 protocol, two primary phases must be 
implemented. 
x Transmission:  a qubit randomly selected and sent based on photon polarization (Master side). 
x Negotiation: two communication parties check the degree of compatibility between their key obtained. 
In order to produce a final secret key in this phase, four primary stages must be achieved. These stages 
are: 
3.1. Raw Key Extraction (RK) 
The central purpose of RK is to eliminate all   possible   errors which occurred through qubits discussion over a 
quantum channel.  Negotiated communication parties   compare   their   photon polarizations are selected, then, non-
valent qubits  will   be   eliminated,  otherwise, the  qubit will be considered [4,8].  
3.2. Error Estimation (EE) 
The negotiation process is to resolve a quantum key might   occur over a noisy-unsecured classical channel. Such 
channel can cause a partial key damage or unmet conditions due to physical noise of transmission medium.Therefore, 
in order to avoid this dilemma,   both   master and slave   determine   an   error threshold value “Emax” when they are 
sure that there is no attacks on transmission medium.  Then, after each QKD round, they compare some qubits of their 
RK in order to compute a transmission error rate “E”. In a nutshell, if E > Emax they can be sure about existence of an 
attack [9]. 
3.3. Key Reconciliation (KR) 
In case of E ≤ Emax, errors might/can be found within the non-valent parts of the raw key. KR is   provided to 
minimize those errors within the key as possible. This stage consists of a number of sub-stages.  Such dividing the raw 
key into blocks of length K bits,   computing the parity   bits for each block and parity comparison [12]. Finally, those 
sup-stage are repeatedly executed by communication parties for N number of rounds. 
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3.4. Privacy Amplification (PA) 
PA is the final stage of quantum key extraction protocol (BB84) which applied to minimize the number of bits that 
an attack might know the raw resolved key from KR [10, 11].  Communication parties apply a shrinking method to 
their qubits sequences in a way that reduces the authentication cost and reduces an attacker presence [12]. 
4. Experimental Environment  
In order to create an innovative system capable to simulate the processes of QKD system and quantum computation, 
the illustration and description of physical processes must be achieved. Any process of quantum mechanics can be 
depicted as an operator (operator is formalized as multiplication by a matrix). Consequently, the logic gates (circuits), 
embrace the operator as a square matrix, are given in matrices of vectors. Drastically, matrices illustration is a 
delightful topic in scientific quantum computing. Furthermore, many tools and random algorithms are considered in 
the simulation of QKD.  
Generally, Master and Slave must be guaranteed an acceptance secure communication without the presence of the 
attack. Consequently, in order to obtain the quantum cryptographic key, two communication parties going to be 
executed the stages of the QKD-BB84 (RK, EE, KR and PA).  
As shown in figure 2, the main hardware requirements for the deployment of BB84 simulation are at least two 
computers machines connected by switches. Each machine has a static IP (computer join to domain) to communicate 
over the switch and on each machine will implement assigned software (Master, Slave). The simulation is performed 
using a Core i5 (4.8 GHz) processor associated with 8GB of RAM as a Master hardware and a Core i3 (2.4 GHz) 
processor associated with 4GB of RAM as a Slave hardware. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Experimental environment for QKD –BB84 
In addition, Figure 3 shows the main parameter for system development (simulation environment) such as states, 
mathematics operations, randomness algorithms, etc. 
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Fig. 3. Main diagram for QKD simulator: basic parameters and key distillation phases  
The availability of these parameters in our simulator gives the tester an insight look and experience of BB84 
protocol work.  The procedure of the BB84 protocol simulation is illustrated as follows: 
 
- Master sends to slave a sequence of random photon states  (independently chosen), 
௦ܲ ൌ ሼ݌଴ǡ ݌ଵǡ ݌ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݌௡ሽǡ ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ௦ܲ  א ՛ǡ՜ǡ ա ܽ݊݀ ՠǤ 
- For each photon deployed  bases ( ௕ܲ), Slave randomly selected one of two measure of ௕ܲ ൌ ሺ ൈǡ൅ሻǤ  
- Master and Slave eliminate all non-valent bases. 
- Master and Slave compute the error percentage (ܧ௥), and compare with threshold (ܧ௧ሻ 
݂݅ܧ௥ ൑ ܧ௧, go to the next step, otherwise, aborting negotiation. 
- Master and Slave obtained a series of an initial qubit, according to photon measurement and coding []. 
ܵ௡ ൌ ሼ݅݊ݍݑܾ݅ݐ଴ǡ ݅݊ݍݑܾ݅ݐଵǡ ݅݊ݍݑܾ݅ݐଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݅݊ݍݑܾ݅ݐ௡ሽ 
- Master and Slave perform ሺܭܴሻ  phase, through 
x Divide the intimal series into number of blocks (b) 
ܤ௡ ൌ ሼܾ଴ǡ ܾଵǡ ܾଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܾ௡ሽ 
x Compute the parity bit for each two block which has even location or odd location 
௜ܲୀ଴௜ୀ௡ ൌ ܾሾ݅ሿ 
- Master and Slave perform PA, in order to generate a series of final secret key (Sk). 
ܵ௞ ൌ ሼݏ݇଴ǡ ݏ݇ଵǡ ݏ݇ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݏ݇௡ሽ 
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Finally, this proposed simulator is programmed using Visual Studio Ultimate 2012 (VC#) based on Windows Server 
2012 Data Center as an operating system. As shown in figure 4, the main system GUI has many configurations options 
that strive to make our simulator nears in real environment. 
 
Fig. 4. Main screen of proposed QKD system 
5. Results and Discussion  
This section demonstrates the experimental results of the developed simulator based on the precise hardware 
specification with different configurations (such as length of initial qubits are pumped, noise level and attack 
influences). Moreover, analytical analysis and QKD usage are discussed in the following sections.  
5.1. Analytical analysis  
This subsection discusses the experimental results are obtained in our simulator environment. Figure 5 illustrates 
that the simulator reflects the number of qubits resolved at each phase of   the   QKD phases, in qubits, gained by two 
communication parties where the noise level assigned to 0.5 GHZ without attacking. This figure reveals the simulator 
is starting from 5000 (an initial qubit) up-to 20000 qubits and it shows the variance of the obtained results when 
different numbers of qubits are deployed. 
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Fig. 5. Resolved qubits - configuration level: Nr= 0.5 GHZ and attack effect=0.0 GHZ 
Regarding figure 5, at round 1(5000 qubits are pumped), the RK holds 2900 qubits, which in turn are processed till 
the PA phase to succeed  310 qubits. The obtained qubits reduction has occurred during the key distillation phases 
(EE, KR and PA), and the lost qubits are usually known as the authentication cost [8].  
While, figure 6 shows the length of secret keys are obtained with a new optional configurations, noisy rate (Nr) and 
influence of attacks set to 0.5 GHZ. In a sense, when the 5000-qubits are deployed as initial qubits, 2100-qubits are 
provided. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Resolved qubits –configuration level: Nr=0.5 and attack effect=-0.5 
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Generally, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) between the initial qubits are pumped and the RK extraction is 26.1% 
when the Nr set to 0,5 GHZ without the presence of eavesdroppers. That’s mean, just 7% is the ratio of the final secret 
key has been obtained (relation between initial qubit and PA). On the other side (Nr=0.5, attack influence =0.5), the 
QBER between initial qubits and the RK extraction is 54%. This ratio indicates just 3% is the ratio of the final secret 
key has been obtained. Now, we can conclude from above: 
- The influences such as unexpected noise, attack intrusion, and key distillation phases are considered as the 
main reason beyond the authentication cost issue.   
- Any change in the value of configuration levels (increasing or decreasing) direct impact on the length of the 
secret key and the time of generation it.  
 
 
5.2 QKD Usage 
As noted above, the process of quantum key generation mainly depends on deploying photons’ between two 
communication parties over limited distances (314-kilometer) [2, 3]. Such distance limitation considered as a big 
problem for authors and organizations, also, it effects on the technology adopted in the real world of network 
communications. Accordingly, to overcome this obstacle, NIST and DIEHARD suites have been implemented in order 
to examine and to evaluate the randomness rates for final resolved qubits based on the p-values. Regarding [1], the P-
value indicates the true randomness of the qubits generation and periodically changed with the rounds’ contents. The 
randomness characteristic helps to adopt the QKD as a source to generate a random number that used with various 
encryption algorithms (key session). So, this feature helps to adopt the quantum technology, as an excellent source of 
generating random numbers see figure 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7. QKD integration capability (randomness property) 
 
In order to assure the strength of such keys, Omer et al [4] developed a new version of the symmetric AES integrated 
between cryptographic quantum key and traditional AES. Such developed algorithm guarantees an unconditional 
security level [8] for any cipher system built on symmetric encryption algorithms [for more details see [4]]. 
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6. Conclusion and Future Works 
QKD is a new emerging technology for cryptographic key generation and distribution.  Accordingly, this paper 
presents the QKD as an alternative for the traditional key distribution protocols. It implements the QKD –BB84 
protocol using two different modes, with/without attack influences, based on a holistic simulation (experimental and 
real simulator). 
 After then, the obtained results associated with various configurations, such as length of an initial qubit, noise level 
and attack influences, are discussed.   Such configurations show direct effects on the length of the obtained key and 
the time needed for the key generation. Finally, the paper reveals that the QKD has the capability to integrate with 
different security applications or modern encryption algorithms.  
In the future, a new version of BB84 protocol will be developed and implemented with two different 
communications modes, offline and online modes. 
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